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Based on interviews of MFIs in post war - Burundi about factors affecting their 2011 client 
loan defaults, this paper analyses how these factors contribute to a lower repayment rate using 
information asymmetry and an enforcement model. The primary repayment rate challenges 
found include confusing a loan with a grant, client mobility/migration, population 
displacement along with the creation of varieties of population features, households 
asset/wealth/ losses and genuine small business risk&/market losses/. 
The increase in in the number of risky borrowers as a result of a rise in the misunderstanding 
of a loan due to long-term relief intervention can lead to a high-risk, low- repayment rate 
equilibrium under adverse selection scenarios. Furthermore, the resulting loss of willingness 
to repay the loan makes enforcement difficult. The decrease in the incentive power of future 
loans due to client migration,  a lower social stigma resulting from the creation of various 
population features in the community along with population  displacement, and a lower 
implicit group collateral possibility as a result of  household asset/wealth losses  weaken peer 
pressure, monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, thereby reducing the loan repayment rate.  
Understanding the interrelationship of these factors is crucial for MFIs in a post-war setting 












Abstract ................................................................................................................................... V 
List of abbreviations ................................................................................................................ VII 
1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 1 
2 Burundi and microfinance .................................................................................................. 4 
2.1 General overview of Burundi ...................................................................................... 4 
2.1 Overview of Microfinance in Burundi ........................................................................ 5 
3 Responses from the  MFIs .................................................................................................. 7 
3.1 Frequency measured as the total number of MFIs stating each reason ....................... 8 
Figure 3. 1 Reasons for the loan default with the associated frequency .................................... 8 
3.2 Description of main reasons for loan default ............................................................... 9 
3.2.1 Misconception of micro-loan product as a grant .................................................. 9 
3.2.2 Population mobility /migration .......................................................................... 10 
3.2.3 Household loss of assets due to the long civil war. ............................................ 11 
3.2.4 The creation of various population features in the community and population 
displacement. .................................................................................................................... 12 
3.2.5 High client business risks/ market losses ........................................................... 14 
4 Information asymmetry and enforcement explanations ................................................... 16 
4.1 Adverse Selection Model ........................................................................................... 18 
Figure 4 A: The expected profit from lending as a function of return for $1.00 lent Eπ(r) ..... 27 
4.2 Moral Hazard Model ................................................................................................. 31 
4.3 Enforcement ............................................................................................................... 38 
Table  A, B , C and D:  Pay-off matrix for group lending with and without group social 
penalty and the pay-off representation of individual lending .................................................. 44 
5 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 50 
References ............................................................................................................................ 52 
Appendix ................................................................................................................................ 54 
  
Figure 3. 1 Reasons for the loan default with the associated frequency .................................... 8 
Figure 4 A: The expected profit from lending as a function of return for $1.00 lent Eπ(r) ..... 27 
Table  A, B , C and D:  Pay-off matrix for group lending with and without group social 




 List of abbreviations  
PW    post-war  
MFIs   Microfinance institutions 
RIM   Réseau des Institutions de Microfinance au Burundi 
USAID United States Agency for International Development  
FLN   Forces for National Liberation, also called NLF or FROLINA 
CECEM Caisse Coopérative d'Epargne et de Crédit Mutuel 
FSTS  Fonds de Solidarité des Travailleurs de la Santé 
 FSTJ  Fonds de Solidarité des Cadres Judiciaires 
 FSTE  Fonds de Solidarité des Travailleurs de l'Enseignement 
FENACOBU Fédération Nationale des COOPECS du Burundi 
SACCOs  Saving and credit cooperatives  
NGOs  Non-Governmental organizations  





While finance is important for post-war (PW) economic reconstruction,   the features unique 
in such an economy can be detrimental for sustainable intervention for a particular area.   
Microfinance intervention (MFI) has potential, but the intervention of microcredit has been 
debatable because of the risks associated with undertaking it.  The unique potential of 
microfinance to reduce poverty and sustain itself can easily be lost if MFIs are not committed 
to ensuring sustainable outreach to the targeted clients through strict loan collection effort.  
Loan repayment risks as a result of factors related to such post-war situations as population 
mobility, clients confusing micro-credit with a grant, the displacement of populations from their 
original homes and the creation of various population features, household asset/wealth losses, and 
high business and market risks necessitate that MFIs address these issues for the intervention to be 
reliable and effective.  
In a world with perfect and complete market where there is no information asymmetry and 
enforcement problems the credit risk due to the these post-conflict factors can easily be 
controlled. However the market is far more imperfect and possible more in the post conflict 
scenario. The information asymmetry concerning the intent characteristics of borrowers (adverse 
selection), the monitoring of the actions of borrowers after they are given the loan (moral hazard), 
and the enforcement problems are more challenging in the presence of these post-conflict factors.  
Population mobility makes enforcement difficult as well as impacting the efforts of the client after 
taking the loan. In addition, Misconception of loan with a grant creates risky characteristic for 
loan in the population worsening the adverse selection problem. On the other hand client 
misconception can also affect loan enforcement. And although clients may invest the funds 
properly and no adverse selection associated with misconception; their willingness to repay the 
loan can still be affected by their misunderstanding the concept of a microloan. The household 
wealth /assets/ losses inhibit the possibility of monitoring and enforcing the loan contract through 
physical collateral or a societal implicit collateral system. The population displacement and the 
post-conflict population characteristics can reduce the social stigma, thereby reducing the benefit 
of using social sanctions for loan enforcement and monitoring. The business risks that are 
intensified due to the lower purchasing power of the general public and the insecurity/theft in the 
market exposes small business operators to genuine risks, resulting in loan default.  
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The microfinance sector in Burundi is facing these post-war challenges as it attempts to finance 
economic activity and rebuild the society. “According to RIM (Réseau des Institutions de 
Microfinance au Burundi) (2010), the financial results of many of Burundian MFIs in 2007–09 
were not good. Many MFIs took losses, while few managed to make profits, and the return to 
assets reached 30% for some MFIs. In general, Burundian MFIs appear to be very diverse in their 
financial results” (Moi¨se Sagamba 2012 et al.). In addition, the country has faced the negative 
experience of two fly-by-night MFIs which took the people’s savings and then closed before the 
National Bank of Burundi instituted a more stringent registration and licensing process for MFIs. 
(USAID, 2008).  
In spite of the high risks and costs faced by the microfinance institutions in such post-conflict 
areas, no scientific research has been conducted on understanding how post-war factors affect 
loan repayment rates of MFIs, with most of the literature focusing on case studies, donor briefs 
and practitioner reports on the challenges of operating in the PW environment. The study reported 
here take the step to provide scientific economic knowledge through exploring the post-conflict 
factors that determines loan repayment rate in Burundi and provide theoretical economic 
explanation about their consequence on loan repayment rate. Using the information collected 
through interviewing MFIs in post-war Burundi, this study explores what and how post-war 
factors determine the loan repayment rates of MFIs in relation to information asymmetry and 
enforcement problem. 
The data collection involved all 21 MFIs operating in the year 2011, focusing  on finding 
information on the primary reasons for their loan defaults in that year and  the post-war related 
factors affecting their loan repayments. Moreover to get the general characteristic of the MFIs and 
undertake comparison between MFIs attribute and the stated reasons for clients loan defaults, I 
interviewed the MFIs on the characteristic1 of MFIs and reviewed secondary information such as 
MFIs manuals and reports. However, most of the interview response on the general characteristic 
of MFIs was mostly unsuccessful and since I could not get enough reply on it from the MFIs. 
The rest of this thesis is organized into the following three sections.  The next section, Section 
Two, provides an overview of Burundi and its MFIs.  Section Three presents the general 
information obtained from the MFI interviews.  The section elaborates loan repayment challenges 
/source of client defaults as identified by the MFIs, the frequency for each reason based on the 
                                                 
1
 Number of product types, loan product characteristic , MFI type, breadth  and depth of outreach, operational 
area, and age of MFI 
3 
 
number of time it was mentioned, and an overall description based on how MFIs explained each 
reason along with a general economic explanation of how the factors affect loan repayment. 
Finally, Section Four I analyses with economic theory, how the post-war can be detrimental for 
loan repayment rate by building up information asymmetry and enforcement model.  
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2     Burundi and microfinance  
2.1 General overview of Burundi 
 
Burundi, a land-locked country located in the Great Lakes Region of Eastern Africa, has a 
population of 10,557,259 composed of two major ethnic groups, the  Hutus and the Tutsis, 
representing 85% and 14% of the total population, respectively, according to the July 2011 
World Fact Book.   
Since its independence in 1962, the country has experienced two genocides as defined by the 
final report of the International Commission of Inquiry for Burundi presented to the United 
Nations Security Council in 2002, the 1972 mass killings of the Hutus by the Tutsi-dominated 
army and the 1993 mass killings of the Tutsis by the Hutu populace. This ethnic violence, 
which lasted for decades, led to the torture and the killing of thousands of people.  While 
many attempts at a peace agreement were made through the intervention of various 
international actors, the last cease-fire between Burundi President Nkurunziza and the leader, 
the remaining opposition group FNL (Forces for National Liberation, also called NLF or 
FROLINA) was not signed until May 26, 2008, through the mediation of South Africa’s 
Minister for Safety and Security.  
The country is now experiencing a post-conflict economy as it recovers from the long civil 
war. According to the country’s 2012 strategy report, its economy is not adequately 
diversified, and remains highly vulnerable to external shocks (small landlocked country), 
political instability, as well as climate change.  Small agriculture holdings are the mainstay of 
the economy, accounting for 43% of the GDP and 90% of the workforce. Although various 
developmental interventions and financial sectors such as banks and MFIs have expanded to 
support the revitalization of the country, their performance is still affected by the political and 





2.1  Overview of Microfinance in Burundi  
The microfinance institutions in Burundi were opened at different times where most of them 
proliferated after the long civil war in the country. The five institutions opened before the war 
is CECEM, FSTS, FSTJ, FSTE, and FENACOBU, all being saving and credit cooperatives. 
Currently the country has 25 MFIs,  5 of which operate outside of Bujumbura and the 
remaining 20 in the capital.  The five outside of the capital work primarily in their specific 
regions and in towns around their region, except for one which operates in Bujumbura as 
well.  
There are mainly two forms of MFIs, Saving and credit cooperatives (SACCOs) and public 
limited companies. The SACCOs usually relay on financing various public employees 
through salary loan. The main source of funds for most institutions, especially for the 
SACCOs, is the savings of the clients. Bank loans and donor funds are also used by most 
institutions as funding sources.   
According to  2011 data from RIM (Réseau des Institutions de Microfinance au Burundi), the 
total number of customers, the amount of loans granted and the average loan disbursed by the 
MFIs in Burundi were half a million, 63 million, and 4 million, respectively. The primary 
economic sectors or activities financed by the microfinance institutions include agriculture, 
commerce, craft, social entities and housing, with business/commerce/ finance receiving the 
largest share, 36%, followed by housing and agriculture at 26% and 24%, respectively.  
Most of the MFIs mainly provide saving and credit products, except for one institution that 
reports remittance as an additional financial product. Usually, the loan products are 
distributed to groups backed by a group guarantee system or individually with a property or 
salary guarantee. To encourage loan enforcement, most MFIs use the Grameen Bank dynamic 
incentive strategy. The size of loan disbursed to clients’ increases every time it is paid off.   
The interest rates charged by the MFIs are a flat monthly or yearly rate depending on the loan 
products the institutions offer. The annual interest rate  ranges from 10 % to 18%, while  the 
monthly interest rate charge of most institutions is between  2% to 3%,  except for one MFI 
which charges up to 8% per month for overdraft loans which have to be paid in a month’s 
time.  
The repayment rate of MFIs for the year 2011 ranged from 66.9% to 99.4%, with most 
institutions indicating that the loan repayment risks emanating from the post-war factors were 
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less pervasive that year, evidence that the country was recovering. However, these institutions 
reported that they had encountered huge loan losses in the past as a result of factors related to 
operating in a post-war scenario, factors that remain reasons for loan failures.  
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3 Responses from the  MFIs  
To understand the post-conflict factors affecting the loan repayment rate of the MFIs in 
Burundi, managers of 21 institutions in operation in 2011 were interviewed concerning the 
reasons for their client loan defaults that year.  That date was used in order to ensure this 
research was based on the most recent, consistent information available. The primary 
questions focused on the reasons for the defaults and the post-war related factors affecting 
their loan repayments. Since these two questions are very similar, the replies were also.  
However the main difference was that the first question centered on the general challenges/ 
reasons for loan repayment problems whereas the second focused specifically on factors 
related to the post-war situation of the country and loan repayment problems. The similarity 
in the answers to the two questions appears to imply that post-war related factors may be the 
most significant problem among the MFIs.  
The responses received were classified into the following five reasons:  
1- Misconception of micro-loan products as grants  
2- High potential population mobility/migration   
3- Household loss of assets due to the long civil war.  
4- The creation of various population features in the community  
5- High client business risks/market losses 
To determine the association, if any, between the reasons mentioned and the MFIs 
themselves, the interview also asked for information on such characteristics as number of 
product types, loan product attributes interest rates, MFI type, breadth and depth of outreach, 
operational areas, and years in business.    The difficulty in obtaining complete information 
and the diversity in most of these characteristics made it difficult to draw conclusions relating 
to the general feature of MFIs and their reasons.  
However, generally, the confusion between a loan and a grant appears to be highly prevalent 
in rural areas; this misconception was the primary reason given by all the institutions outside 
of Bujumbura.  On the other hand, client migration and business risk were  mentioned the 




The section below more specifically analyses the number of MFIs mentioning each reason, 
including providing a general description of each and their relationship to client loan defaults.  
3.1 Frequency measured as the total number of 
MFIs stating each reason  
The frequency figure below shows the number of times each reason was mentioned by the 21 
MFIs interviewed.  As it illustrates, misconception of a micro-loan as a grant, client 
mobility/migration, business risk, creation of various population features, and client asset 
losses were mentioned by 48%, 43%, 38%, 19% and 19% of the MFIs, respectively. The first 
three problems seem to be most frequently mentioned by most institutions.  




Source: Interviews with the managers of 21MFIs in Burundi   






3.2 Description of main reasons for loan default  
3.2.1 Misconception of micro-loan product as a grant 
As a result of the long civil war in Burundi, people have received various relief and 
development grants. Recently, some programs have been restructured as other forms of 
development assistance while some still function as grants.   The previous culture of receiving 
grants has led to the misperception of the micro-loan products provided by the MFIs.  In 
addition, some of the grant intervention is provided by the mother NGOs of the MFIs, and 
even some of the MFIs themselves have similar names, further complicating the confusion 
between loans and grants.    
The guarantee fund strategy that MFI uses in collaboration with relief and development 
organizations also adds to the clients’ misconceptions. As  will be illustrated in Reason 3.2.4 
below, one of the areas that makes a  post-war economy different from a normal one is the 
various population features created as a result of the conflict--refuges, returnees, internally 
displaced populations, ex-soldiers/demobilized soldiers, and inhabitants. These different 
population sections have their own unique risks that lead to loan repayment risks. The 
guarantee fund is one of the strategies extended by some NGOs to the MFIs for incentivizing 
them to expand their financial efforts to include various risky segments such as refugees and 
demobilized soldiers. However, when clients see the collaboration between the MFI and the 
NGO that used to assist them with grants, they wrongly misconceive the loan as a donation 
and, thus, default on it.  
The creation of clients’ misconception of a loan can result in default through several ways. 
When clients misunderstand a loan, they may not invest in a venture that enables them to 
repay it. Clients may be more irresponsible with their investment when they think it is aid   
rather than money that they need to repay. On the other hand, clients might invest it safely, 
but due to their misperception, they do not pay back the money even if they can.  Thus, 
misconception of the loan as a grant can result in adverse selection and enforcement 





3.2.2 Population mobility /migration  
High population mobility is a feature unique to the post-war environment. People flee their 
countries or areas, searching for better economic and political situations.  This migration can 
create challenges for micro-credit intervention because it increases the risk of default.  After 
receiving a loan, clients may move out of the country and fail to repay it.  As mentioned in 
Section 3.1, client mobility is one of the frequent reasons for clients default as evidenced by 
the 9 MFIs citing it.  Most other MFIs stated it as a prevalent problem in the past even though 
they hadn’t encountered it in 2011.   
Five of the nine MFIs that indicated client mobility as a reason for default are SACCOs that 
primarily use the salary guarantee system as collateral for a loan. In this system, clients 
supply a written agreement from their employers to directly transfer payment to the MFI 
account from their salary.  This reduces involuntary and voluntary defaults by making the 
employer responsible for the payment of the loan. However, even this salary loan system is 
not far from the effect of clients’ migration on loan repayment failure. In cases where clients 
leave their jobs and move out of the country without any notice to their employer, their salary 
automatically ceases as do the loan payments, meaning that the amount still owed defaults.    
However, with the salary guarantee system, 2 MFIs mentioned receiving repayments on loans 
that they had written off in previous periods. Through employer tracking and records, when 
the clients returned to the country, they were able to enforce the loan agreement.    Although 
client migration is a challenge even to the MFIs using the salary guarantee system, 
collaboration with the employers helped in collecting the loans in cases where clients returned 
to the country. However, this system is available for only certain segments of the society, so 
its use and benefit are not widely applicable.  
One of the ways for addressing the effect of migration on loan default is through the MFIs’ 
dynamic incentive instrument that is used to curtail moral hazard and enforcement problems. 
The MFIs provide dynamic incentive contracts by offering repeat loans only for borrowers 
who repay them.   This mechanism encourages repayment even in situations where there is a 
weak legal enforcement mechanism and high information barriers monitoring the actions of 
borrowers after receiving the loan. In addition, for MFIs that focus on small loan provisions 
based on collateral that is not easily enforceable, the main deterrent to default is the threat that 
no future loans will be forthcoming.  However, the effectiveness of this dynamic incentive is 
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challenged in situations with a high potential for client mobility. After all moving out of reach 
or leaving the country, the client’s incentive to repay the loan is low.  
 
In the post-conflict setting of Burundi, implementing the dynamic incentive mechanisms 
through repeated lending is not possible for some MFIs.  As a result, the enforcement 
constraint weakens;   the high migration possibility reduces the opportunity cost from 
defaulting, thereby reducing the clients’ incentive to repay the loan.  This result is similar to 
the one mentioned by ESCWA/ECRI/2009/Technical Paper 4 on Microfinance ESCWA 
Conflict Region:  “the goal of loan recovery is hard to achieve with a mobile population who 
may at any time abandon their loan. This is always the case in environment following 
conflict. Conflict could result in migration and population mobility.”  
3.2.3 Household loss of assets due to the long civil war.  
Communities after a series of conflicts are not similar to those living in peace even if the 
income inflow is similar.  A conflict-ridden community has been exposed to significant losses 
of physical and social capital, making undertaking micro-credit risky. The war in Burundi led 
to substantial destruction of assets, losses making it difficult for the people to find collateral 
for borrowing. This adds up on limited liability constraints, making loan repayment difficult 
in cases where clients face bankruptcy of their businesses. Even with the group loan, group 
members need implicit collateral in order to enforce loan repayment and put peer pressure on 
one another.  However, substantial destruction of the assets of a community makes it 
problematic for the group member to pledge implicit collateral.   
As seen in Section 3.1, of the 21 MFIs interviewed, 3 indicated this situation is a problem.  
The clients’ poverty/loss of assets can affect loan repayment by worsening the moral hazard 
and enforcement problem. When MFIs have information barriers on how to monitor the 
clients’ action or the legal mechanism for enforcing the contract is weak, group peer pressure 
and enforcement are the means the institutions use to address the moral hazard and 
enforcement problem. But when people have very little asset to seize among each other’s, 




3.2.4 The creation of various population features in the community 
and population displacement.  
People are displaced from their homes during a war, altering the current settlement of the 
population.  As a result, people living in the same area could be inhabitants, internally 
displaced people, returnees, demobilized soldiers, and/or refugees from neighbouring 
countries, a diverse population requiring time to build social relationships.  This situation 
again reduces the traditional MFI group lending social enforcement power. Although most 
MFIs mentioned their success in group lending, some stated that this system is challenging in 
a post-conflict environment. The creation of various population features brings differences in 
socio-economic backgrounds and in the way the communities cooperate and a lack of 
knowledge about one another, all of which affect the extent to which group loan peer 
monitoring and enforcement are possible.  
The economic explanation for the effect on lower repayment rate is based on the dominance 
of strategic behaviour rather than social concerns in group lending. According to Xavier 
(2006), strategic behaviour and social concerns interact to yield effective contracts that can 
work both for customers and lenders. With people being less socially integrated, it is unlikely 
that the social factors override strategic behaviour for yielding incentive compatible contracts 
that ensure repayment. 
The creation of various risky population features are mentioned as an important post-conflict 
factor creating credit risks beyond the impact caused by issues concerning their integration  
into the society or their lower social stigma. Each of the population features mentioned here is 
prone to the risks mentioned previously, making financing them challenging. In the interview, 
the MFIs were asked about the number of each population feature they finance, and their 
experience of financing each.  While the number of each population features being financed 
was not available, some MFIs elaborated on their experiences of financing the different 
population segments, with the misconception of loan as a grant, high mobility/migration 
potential, asset losses and lower social stigma being mentioned as being significantly higher 
among internally displaced populations, returnees, and demobilized soldiers than inhabitants, 
precisely because of their characteristics. 
Refugees--These are considered by most institutions as highly mobile, compounded by the 
difficulty in knowing when will return to their country. In addition, they have little collateral, 
and most of what they have is in their home country, meaning they have little to guarantee a 
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loan.  Their lack of enough financial knowledge about the micro-loan product is another 
challenge. Because of the high relief intervention addressing the situations of refugees, their 
conception of micro-loan is mixed with a grant, making it risky to jump-start micro-loan 
provisions to this sector of society until they are educated about financial products and their 
responsibilities.   
For these reason, some MFIs take away their target from refugees using implicit loan 
screenings. Two MFIs indicated they finance refugees but require more collateral, and 1 
stated the unsatisfactory loan repayment reputation of refugees.  Of the 8 who commented on 
the issues of financing refugees, only 3 finance them but require more collateral than usual 
because of the high risk, while the remaining 5 do not finance them because of the high risks 
involved.   
While refugees need financial support in order to engage in economic activities that enable 
them to provide for their own needs, the financial risks associated with them need to be 
weighed carefully for microcredit intervention to be practical. Their high mobility, lack of 
suitable collateral, and high misconception of loan as a grant are the important risks that 
expose MFIs to a reduced chance of getting their loan back. MFIs should adopt a strategy 
addressing these risks in their micro-credit intervention with this segment of society.   
Internally displaced people (IDP) —This population includes those who have left their 
homes, including all their constituents and located in another part of the country in search of 
safety and security. Internally displaced people (IDP) share some characteristics with refugees 
as they are displaced from their original living place for an undetermined length of time. Like 
refugees, they have also left their assets and are less integrated in the social and economic life 
of the new location, increasing the risk of financing this group. Two MFIs addressed their 
experiences of financing internally displaced people, both highlighting the risks of advancing 
loans to this segment. From the reply of the MFIs the participation of IDP in economic 
activity and develop financial demand is a necessary condition for micro-credit provision. 
However, with IDPs priority of satisfying their settlement issues and all the accompanying 
basic needs, extending micro-credit to IDP become a risky venture.     
Demobilized soldiers--These are ex-soldiers, either on the rebel or the government side. 
Some MFIs classify demobilized soldiers who were part of the rebel army and the 
government army because of the difference in their characteristics and, hence, their risks for 
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financing. Finance is an important means for enabling ex-soldiers to become part of a 
business or self-employed, but it is not the complete solution. Because of the influence of the 
army and/or war, soldiers may have developed undesirable and risky character habits that 
need to be addressed before it is safe to introduce micro-loan products to this segment of the 
population.   
Some institutions explain that ex-soldiers lack a viable borrower character by the very fact 
that they have developed habits which can make them risky to finance. Without a substantial 
change in character, the intervention of a micro-loan provision may prove meaningless. 
According to some MFIs, some ex-soldiers consider the micro-loan as their entitlement, and 
they lack the willingness to repay or to invest the loan in the venture that enables them to 
repay the loan.  
Of the 7 MFIs that mentioned their finance experience with demobilized soldiers, 3 indicated 
that they have had a good experience and 4 mentioned a poor reputation as a critical problem 
in not getting their money back. Most of the good experiences with demobilized soldiers 
came from those who finance the ex-combatants from the government army with a guarantee 
of their pension from the Ministry of Defense.   
Returnees—these are former refugees or IDP who have returned to their original homes or 
settled permanently in a new area in the country.  Of the 3 MFIs that discussed their financial 
interventions with returnees, 2 reported bad experiences and 1 a successful experience. The 
main challenge that was mentioned in financing returnees was the free aid mentality that they 
develop as a result of the relief/grant assistance provided during their migration/displacement 
periods.  Without the returnees adequately internalizing the micro-credit concept, the loan 
portfolio is susceptible to substantial risks. 
3.2.5 High client business risks/ market losses 
Business risk is one reason for client loan defaults. In its post-conflict economy, Burundi is 
experiencing high unemployment and low purchasing power of the general public, producing 
significant market problems for small business. 
According to the United Nations Policy for Post-conflict Employment Creation, Income 
Generation and Reintegration Report of 2009, conflict is detrimental for growth, and 
employment creation by destroying infrastructure, stalling private investment, distracting the 
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input and output markets, damaging social fabric, destroying jobs and driving down wages. In 
addition, conflict exacerbates urban and rural unemployment. These also lead to a significant 
decrease in income and purchasing power of the general public. 
From the replies of the MFIs, the effect of the long civil war in Burundi was no different.   
Clients with good business prospects were reported to have faced the risk of bankruptcy due 
to the lack of sufficient market in the country.  In addition, security problems/thefts of small 
businesses operating in the market were other reasons for small business failures and, thus, 
client loan defaults.    
As Section 2.1 indicated, in 2011 the total share of MFI loans channelled towards the business 
sector was larger than for any other activity, and the total number of MFIs financing 
commerce is larger than the total number of MFIs financing other activities. This significant 
financial intervention of the MFIs might make the market problem more highly pronounced 
as a reason for clients loan default.  
In the next section I economically explain how the aforementioned post-conflict factors affect 






4 Information asymmetry and 
enforcement explanations  
Based on the general assessment of the findings from the field interviews in the previous 
section, this section explains the loan repayment challenges of the MFIs using the information 
asymmetry and enforcement model. The four factors focused on in the model are explained 
below.   
1- Misperception of a micro-loan product as a grant: - This misconception is primarily 
caused by the past relief experience of the people. It basically can affect loan repayment in 
two ways. When a borrower misconceives the loan, it loses its willingness to repay back even 
if it manages to invest the borrowed money properly and gain possible leverage out of it. . On 
the other hand borrowers who misconceive the loan can be risky if people are more 
irresponsible in investing aid/grant money than loan. The later situation can add up to adverse 
selection problem and there by worsen loan repayment rate. This is occurred because under 
imperfect information that the microfinance have on intent characteristic of the borrowers 
(that is on whether a borrower’s attitude towards the loan is wrong so that he will use it for 
risky investment or a borrower has the correct understanding of the loan and will use it for 
safe investment), the higher proportion of misconceiving clients can lead MFIs to high risk 
equilibrium point (with lower probability of loan repayment).   
2- High potential of population mobility/migration:-In a post-war environment, the 
possibility of potential migration is high. This factor will be examined from the perspective 
that it decreases the incentive power of the dynamic incentive mechanism (i.e. providing 
loans for the next period only to those who repaid their loans) that the MFIs primarily use to 
address the moral hazard and enforcement problem.  
3- The creation of various population features in the community and the displacement of 
the people:-Most people are displaced from their original homes to other places in the 
country; some return to their original home or move to new locations in the country; some 
have been soldiers in a war; some are refugees from neighbouring countries; some are 
inhabitants who have lived here before, during and after the war. While these characteristics 
may have various implications, this study focuses on the lowering of the social stigma/ 
sanctions between the communities.   
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4- Household loss of assets due to the long civil war: - This study discusses this feature 
from the perspective that it shrinks the implicit collateral penalty that groups use in order to 
apply pressure or enforce loan repayment among their members. 
These post-conflict factors are explored here to show how they are detrimental to the 
likelihood of MFIs getting their money back because of their effect on the instruments 
typically used by MFIs to address information asymmetry (adverse selection and moral 
hazard) and enforcement problems.  
Section 4.1 discusses how peoples’ misconception of a loan lowers the repayment rate by 
analysing its effect on the adverse selection problem. In a post-war environment like in 
Burundi, there is a high likelihood for people to misperceive the micro-loan intervention as a 
grant, 
2
 creating a significant number of risky clients, leading to a high risk and low 
repayment rate equilibrium for the MFIs. Furthermore, group loans might not solve the MFI 
screening problem when the proportion of risky borrowers is so high that it no longer is 
proportional to the number of safe clients given the group size and under imperfect 
information that the societies might have about one another because of population mobility, 
the creation of various population features. Therefore, adverse selection because of the post-
conflict factors can result in lower loan repayment rates.  
Section 4.2 analyses the effect of the post-conflict factors on loan repayment rate from the 
moral hazard perspective, focusing on three of the post conflict factors discussed earlier. The 
lower social stigma created by the various population features, the loss of assets by most 
borrowers, making the implicit collateral needed for a group loan difficult to find, and the 
high population mobility that reduces the  incentive of future loans to exert  optimal effort 
make it difficult for MFIs to address the moral hazard problem in a  post-conflict 
environment. Therefore, they realize a lower repayment rate.  
The last section focuses on the enforcement perspective using the same three factors, showing   
that the lower social stigma, implicit collateral possibilities and population mobility created 
by post-conflict factors loosen the enforcement constraint, thereby lowering the loan 
repayment rate. In addition, this section shows how the misconception of a micro-loan as a 
grant can also affect repayment rate from the perspective of affecting loan enforcement.  
                                                 
2
 This is due to the extensive relief and aid intervention in such environment 
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4.1 Adverse Selection Model 
Under the scenario of adverse selection where MFIs cannot distinguish the intent 
characteristics of borrowers that could have implications on loan repayment, the increase in 
the proportion of risky clients can lead to a high-risk, low-repayment rate equilibrium. 
Clients’ misperception of loans can create a risky characteristic on the part of the borrower 
depending on how the misconceiving clients assumed to act.   
A borrower’s conception of a loan matters because people manage grants differently from 
loans.  There are two possible ways of looking at this situation:  
1- People make safer investment options with their own money /grants/ than with loaned 
money. So when they conceive of a micro-loan as a grant, they put it in a safe 
investment option. 
2-  People can be more irresponsible in their investment when they receive aid than with 
a loan because the burden of repaying the loan can make people more responsible with 
it rather than a grant.  The irresponsible investment as a result of the misconception of 
a loan as a grant can, therefore, create risky behaviour leading to an adverse selection 
problem.  
In the first possibility the very fact that people misconceive the loan as a grant can lead to a 
safer investment option than gambling and may not result in an adverse selection problem. 
These clients will be less likely to gamble than those with the correct understanding of a loan. 
The following model explains this case: 
Consider an individual who can invest in a safe small return and zero risk projects and a risky 
project (gamble). The investment is $1. In the safe investment the net return is y. In the 
gamble the probability of S (success) is p  while the probability of F (failure) is (1− p) . In 
the case of S, the return is Y s>1 . In case of failure, it is 0 (for simplicity). 
The expected net return of the gamble is 
ỹ= pY s−1.....................................................................(1)  
With limited liability the expected net return is 
ȳ= p(Y s−1)................................................................... (2)  
It is obvious that ȳ> ỹ . Now, the condition for gambling with borrowed money is ȳ>y  
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The condition for gambling with the one’s own money is ỹ>y . 
A client willing to gamble with his own money would also be willing to gamble with 
borrowed money (under limited liability). 
A client could be willing to gamble with borrowed money even when the gamble has a 
negative expected net return.   
In line with this differential treatment of borrowed money and one’s own money, the 
misconception of loan with grant can lead to a safer investment option than gambling and not 
add to the adverse selection problem.  Although ex-ant misconception leads to a safe 
investment option, ex-post can still intensify the enforcement problem. The clients who 
misperceive the loan as a grant are less likely to be willing to repay the loan. The detailed 
explanation of the effect of client misconception of the loan on enforcement problem is 
presented in Section 4.3.  
The second way of looking at the misconception of a loan is that when borrowers consider the 
loan as a grant, they will be less responsible in their investment because it reduces the feeling 
of responsibility for the fund’s management that would have been created as a result of the 
burden of repayment. This perspective has adverse selection implication as irresponsible 
investment characteristic by clients who misconceive the loan bring risky characteristic. 
Hence, in an adverse selection environment with other elements being constant, the increase 
in the proportion of clients who misconceive the loan as a grant can result in a high risk 
pooling equilibrium for MFIs. The adverse selection model presented in this section illustrates 
this scenario.  
When MFI are unable to distinguish between borrowers there is only pooling equilibrium 
were all heterogeneous borrowers borrow at the same rate. And in an adverse selection 
scenario like the one presented here, the high proportion of risky borrowers (in this case 
uninformed/ those who misconceive the loan as a grant) as a result of high relief intervention 
leads MFIs to an  equilibrium with only risky borrowers,  thereby increasing the probability of 
loan defaults.  
The screening problem in the adverse selection problem is addressed by group lending. The 
benefit mentioned by most MFIs interviewed here is when borrowers have good information 
about one another.   Since the society knows its members, it can easily screen safe vs risky 
( ȳ>y>0> ỹ f.ex when y=1/10 ;Y s=3 ; p=1/4)
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clients, making the group loan an easy solution for the screening problem even in the post-war 
scenario. Some MFIs have even changed to this strategy.  
However when borrowers have little information about one another, there is little to gain from 
a group loan in mitigating the adverse selection problem. Moreover, when the proportion of 
risky borrowers is high, there is little gain from the screening benefit. This could be the reason 
why some MFIs responded that they face a problem in group lending as borrowers complain 
that they cannot find enough partners to be jointly liable.  
Both scenarios will be explained using Ghatak’s (1999) model of group positive assortative 
matching and point out the possibility of heterogeneous matching as a result of unbalanced 
supply to fill the required group size from his extension. In addition, this analysis will discuss 
Armendáriz De Aghion and Gollier’s (2000) finding that under imperfect information positive 
assortative matching might not be the case. Based on these two papers, the reason that some 
MFIs benefit from group screening is that in areas where the borrower proportion is balanced 
enough to form the required group size in Gathak case, and when borrowers have enough 
information in Armendáriz and Gollier’s case, then positive assortative matching is possible, 
and as a result, the screening problem for the MFIs is solved. However, the response by some 
MFIs that borrowers lack enough members to form a group is similar to Ghatak’s (1999) 
extension of the model and Armendáriz De Aghion and Gollier’s (2000) finding; that is when 
borrowers do not know one another or the number their type is not enough to fill the required 
group size, heterogeneous group are possible. In such a case, MFIs gain little from joint 
liability for screening borrowers, reducing the chance that a group loan improves loan 
repayment rate.  
Therefore, a low probability of loan repayment in a post-conflict scenario can occur in an 
adverse selection from the perspective of high proportion of risky type borrowers, resulting in 
a high risk pooling equilibrium with lower loan repayment for MFIs.  Although group loans 
address the problem in some cases,    they do not when borrowers cannot find enough partner 
of its type to fill the required group size and when the borrowers do not know one another. 
Therefore MFIs gain little from group loans in a post-conflict scenario in addressing adverse 
selection to improve repayment rate.   
The section below begins by showing how a high proportion of risky borrows that 
misperceives the loan leads MFIs to high risk pooling equilibrium with lower repayment.  
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Then the findings of Ghatak (1999) and Armendáriz De Aghion and Gollier (2000) in relation 
to group lending, screening problems, and repayment rates are discussed.   
   ASSUMPTIONS 
 Borrowers populated by a continuum of household size 1 and their aim are to 
maximize their payoff or gain.  
 Borrowers are only two types informed (those who have the correct perception about 
the micro-loan product) referred to here as safe borrowers and uninformed (those who 
confuse the loan with a grant) referred to as risky borrowers. 
 The borrowers who misconceive the loan as a grant invest the borrowed funds in a 
high-risk project which can earn them a high return but at a very low probability and 
the informed that have good perception invest it in safe project which has high 
probability of success but with moderate or low return.   
 Projects once started yield success or failure; i.e., only 2 project outcomes which are 
independently distributed across borrowers of the same types as well as across 
different types. 
 The probability of success and earning high return YS for safe and Yr for risky 
borrower is ps and pr, respectively. And the corresponding probability of failure and 
getting 0 returns for safe and risky borrowers is 1- ps and 1-pr, respectively.  With 0< 
pr < ps <1 and Yr   >YS .   This means that by the very nature of their misconception of 
the loan product, the risky borrowers invest in the project which can give them high 
return but at a very low probability of success.      
 I follow Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), and assume that projects have the same mean but 
differ only in terms of riskiness, i.e expected returns,   Ys ps = Yr pr= Y >1 
 Borrowers’ opportunity cost of borrowing is their reservation utility/ the status quo 
reservation pay off which is exiguously given and equal for all types of borrowers. 
 Both borrowers and MFIs are risk neutral. 
 A representative MFI which has a main objective of maximizing social surplus by 
extending a loan until zero profit conduction is satisfied and not making any positive 
profit is used here. 
 The representative microfinance loan fund has an exogenously given constant 
opportunity cost denoted as ρ. This opportunity cost of capital can also be called the 
cost of fund for an MFI.  ρ > 0.  
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 The MFI lends $1.00 and receives a repayment of r > 1 which is the amount to be 
repaid inclusive of interest rate. But this repayment occurs only if a business project 
makes a profit. Otherwise, I suppose that a borrower pays nothing to the MFI; it 
defaults on the loan contract This also implies limited liability, that the borrower’s 
exposure in the contract is limited to project returns and a borrower whose project fails 
owes nothing to the MFI.  
 The investment made through borrowing is expected to return more than the cost of 
the capital and labor so that social surplus is maximized.  pi Yi > u + ρ, where i= s, r 
  λ proportion of borrowers are safe and (1-λ) are risky types.   
 
As in Gathak 1999, I construct the adverse selection model as a 2-stage sequential game 
between a representative MFI and the borrowers. First, the microfinance institution announces 
its interest rate and amount of joint liability, c, to the borrowers and then the borrowers accept 
the contract and select their partners or enjoy their reservation payoff, u. If the borrowers 
decide to accept the loan, projects are carried out and outcome-contingent transfers as 
specified in the contract are met. 
The main objective of the MFI is to maximize the social surplus under the zero profit 
condition.  And then the borrowers decide to enter or not based on the announced interest rate. 
In my model, I  follow Ghatak’s (1999) adverse selection model but extends  some of the 
terms in my study context to show the  implications of specific post-conflict factors in 
intensifying  the adverse selection problem  to increase  the loan repayment risk of  the MFI.   
I begin with a full information scenario, and then extended the model to an adverse selection 
situation involving  information asymmetry concerning the type of borrowers; that is a 
situation in which the MFIs do not have information concerning the type of borrower (risky or 
safe) while the borrowers know one another other very well.  In such an information 
asymmetry scenario, it is shown that the increased proportion of risky borrowers can lead the 






Full information case  
In the full information scenario, the MFI knows the type of borrowers so that it specifies the 
interest rate by setting it higher/lower for risky/safe, respectively. The borrowers then decide 
to enter or not depending on the announced interest rate.
3
  
In the first stage the MFI maximizes the social surplus as   
Max {            } 
Subject to      –       
This optimization implies that the MFI chooses the lowest   , which satisfies the zero profit 
condition, and the MFI knows the type of borrowers, meaning there can be two separate 
interest rates, one for each kind of borrower, where separate equilibrium is possible.  
So in the first stage, the MFI set  
    
     where i= s, r respectively   (Equation 1) 
Equation 1 can similarly be specified as   
   
 
  
,     
   
 
  
  and    




In the full information scenario, the MFI announces separate interest rates for risky and safe 
borrowers,   when the borrower is safe and   when the borrower is risky. From the 
assumption             , Equation 1 gives      . The safe borrowers are given a 
lower interest rate than the risky ones as they are more likely to pay.  
Then based on the announced interest rate (  
 ), the borrower decides whether to participate or 
not.  
For borrower i to prefer borrowing 
        
               .............................(eq3) Participation constraint of  borrower i.  
This implies  
                                                 
3
 Setting the problem in a form where the MFI first  announce its interest rate based on its zero profit conduction 
and then the borrower decided whether to participate or not is similar to setting the maximization problem where 
the MFI maximizing social surplus under the MFI zero profit conduction and the borrowers participation 
constraints. It Maximizes social surplus because the my assumption that MFIs doesn't have profit motive rather 
maximizing the social surplus achieving break-even.  
24 
 
        
     ⇐⇒           
            for safe  to participate  
        
     ⇐⇒             
          for risky to participate  
If this participation constraint holds, the maximum interest rates that borrower i would be 
weakly convenient to demand for a loan can be found. Let that interest rate level be r*.  
Therefore,  
  
    
  
    
However, since the MFI in the first stage announces an interest rate that satisfies the zero 
profit condition, the participation constraint won’t hold.4 And all borrowers participate in the 
second stage.   
All types of borrowers participate in the full information scenario, and the MFI charges the 
interest rate related to the risk types. Therefore, the adverse selection is not a challenge as the 
MFI has full information and can price discriminate between the safe and the risky or ask high 
collateral for the risky borrowers. 
Asymmetric information  
With asymmetric information, the MFI cannot distinguish between safe and risky borrowers, 
but the borrowers know their types. When the MFI cannot differentiate between the two types 
of clients, those who are informed (with the right conception about the micro-loan product 
and invest the finds in a safe investment) and uninformed (with a misunderstanding of the 
loan product as a grant and invest the loan in a risky investment).   In an asymmetric 
information scenario, the MFI cannot write state-contingent contracts based on the type of the 
client.  
Based on the assumption that the main aim of the MFI is to maximize the social surplus under 
the zero profit condition as in the first stage, the MFI announces its interest rate under the 
following optimization constraint. Since the MFI cannot distinguish between the type of 
borrowers, it announces the same interest rate(r) for both borrowers that fulfils the following 
optimization problem:  
 
 
                                                 
4
 Because I already assumed that social surplus is maximized   pi Yi > u + ρ 
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Max  {    }       {    }      
Subject to  
 {           }       {           }  ρ=0 
With rearrangement the optimization problem can also be written as: 
Max        
Subject to  
{           }      
This means the MFI maximizes the social surplus under the information asymmetry condition 
that it cannot distinguish between borrower types subject to the constraint that the expected 
pay-off from borrowing equals outside opportunity. 
The terms in the objective function are  
Y =    Expected project return  
ρ  =        Opportunity cost of capital or cost of fund  for $1. for the MFI. 
u  =     Borrower reservation utility.    
The terms in the constraint are  
{           }  = The expected profit for the MFI from lending $1. Denoted as Eπ. 
{           }         =  Average probability of success 
r=      Return on lending $1. (r) 
ρ =   Opportunity cost of capital or cost of fund for $1. for the MFI. 
Denote {           } as P which has been illustrated above as the average borrower 
individual probability of success, referred to here as the probability of loan repayment as in 
Amitrajeet A. and Hamid  (2010), because it is assumed that if the borrowers are successful, 
then they can repay; if not, they default.  Since the aim here is to show how the increase in the 
proportion of risky type borrowers decreases the probability of loan repayment at equilibrium, 
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the probability of loan repayment P is written as a function of borrowers’ proportion (λ); thus,  
       {           }  
Since           by assumption, this MFI optimization problem implies the MFI will 
choose the lowest possible r that will satisfy the zero profit condition. 
   
 
    
  
Based on the announced r, borrower i in the second stage decides whether to borrow or not.  
Similar to the full information case, borrower i decide to borrow if  
       
               ............................. Participation constraint of borrower i.  
This implies  
       
     ⇐⇒          
            for safe  to participate  
       
     ⇐⇒            
          for risky to participate  
Since        by assumption, safe borrowers have a higher likelihood of getting the money 
implying that safe borrower participation constraint binds at    which is less than the critical 
interest rate/ return of lending that makes a risky borrower participation constraint binds i.e. 
  .  
 Then, for the equilibrium which fulfils both the MFI optimization and the borrowers’ 
participation decisions, the equation below has to be satisfied:  
   
 
     
 
   
  
 
Since ρ is an exogenously given constant, r* can take values higher or lower depending 
on      ,  








The investments made through borrowing are expected to return more than the cost of capital 
and labour (i.e         ) by assumption. Therefore, the above equilibrium condition can 
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always be satisfied for all values of λ.  However, the loan repayment risk for the MFI is not 
the same.  It increases with the increase in (1-λ), and for (1-λ) above a certain threshold, at 
equilibrium only the risky clients will participate. The MFI is then subject to higher risk as the 
probability of loan repayment decreases to a lower level from      to   .  
Graphically, this case is explained below by drawing the expected profit from lending for the 
MFI as a function of return on lending for $1. (r). Since there are only two types of borrowers 
(informed/i.e., safe) or (uninformed/i.e., risky), the graph is not hump-shaped as in Stigliz and 
Weisse (1981) but is similar to Bardhan and Udry (1999) with some discontinuity at    
    
  
  
at a level of r where the safe stop demanding the loan. 
Figure 4 A: The expected profit from lending as a function of return for 
$1.00 lent Eπ(r) 
$ 
The expected profit from lending as a function of r ( i.e., return on $1. lent ) Eπ(r)=P(λ).r has 
a slope P(λ) up to rs  and then  a slope of pr after rs. This means after rs it becomes more flat as 
the loan becomes more risky, having a lower repayment rate pr and only risky clients 
demanding the loan.  
For the range of return on lending rε[0,rs], changes in the proportion of risky clients in the 
economy affect the expected profit from lending and the probability of loan repayment. But 
for r  ε(rs, rr] the change in the proportion of risky clients in the economy leaves the expected 
profit from lending and the probability of loan repayment unchanged.  
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For the extreme cases where the proportion of risky clients is  (1- λ) = 0,  the expected profit 
curve (Eπ(r)=P(λ).r) for rε[0,rs] becomes steeper and has the slope Ps as depicted in the steeper 
dotted line in Figure 1 and the probability of loan repayment increases from P(λ) to Ps. For the 
other extreme case where (1- λ)= 1, the expected profit curve Eπ(r)=P(λ).r, for rε[0,rs]  
becomes flatter and  has a  slope pr  ( slope decreases from P(λ) to Ps ). And the equilibrium r 
becomes above rs, and the probability of loan repayment decreases from P(λ) to pr .
5
 
To show the implication of the proportion of high risky borrowers in the post-war scenario, let 
the initial proportion of risky clients under normal circumstance be (1- λ). This means that the 
proportion of safe clients is λ. For λ proportion, the initial expected profit from lending for the 
MFI is indicated by the bold black straight line which increases with r showing some 
discontinuity at rs at the level of return on lending that makes the safe clients drop out of the 
market. For the exogenously given cost of fund assumed to be  ρ ＜P(λ) rs as depicted in the 
graph, the equilibrium return on lending that satisfies both the borrower and MFI conditions is    
r*= ρ/ P(λ)＜ Y-u/pr. At this equilibrium level the probability of loan repayment is P(λ).  
Ceteris paribus, if there is some exogenous increase in the proportion of risky clients in the 
economy, then the expected profit from lending Eπ(r) for rε[0, rs] becomes flatter as 
represented by the red line in Figure 1. For an increase in the proportion of risky borrowers 
making ρ >P(λ) rs6,  then the new equilibrium r that satisfies the equilibrium condition 
increases from r* to r**=ρ/pr ＜ Y-u/pr.. And at this equilibrium level the probability of loan 
repayment decreases to pr with no safe clients participating at this pooling equilibrium.  
Because of the problem of adverse selection, the MFI cannot separate equilibria for risky and 
safe clients.  No screening mechanism such as the typical group lending means that the MFI 
will have only one pooling equilibrium for both risky and safe clients. Thus, as described 
above, in the adverse selection scenario, the increase in the proportion risky borrowers in the 
                                                 
5
 The shift is because  P(λ) = λps  +(1-λ)pr is the slope of Eπ(r)=P(λ).r  
 From this, 
 since I assumed  that ps > pr 
 dP(λ)/dλ>0  which implies P(λ) increases whenλ increases( when the proportion of safe borrowers 
increases).                dP(λ)/d(1-λ)<0  ,  P(λ) decreases when the proportion of risky borrowers increase. 
6
 Everything constant but exogenous increase in the proportion of risky clients means P(λ)decrease. This is for 
the same reason given in footnote 5 
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economy, lead the MFI at equilibrium to fail from having safer clients that have higher 
probability of success and thereby decreasing its probability loan repayment.   
Therefore, the  increased number of risky uninformed clients in the post-conflict environment 
as a result of relief intervention can cause the new equilibrium r to increase from r* to r**. 
This takes the safe clients out of the market and causes a new decreased loan repayment rate 
Pr  for the MFI. 
The high proportion of risky borrowers in the post conflict economy results in the MFI  
having a  lower probability of getting its loans repaid  because the resulting increase in the 
equilibrium return on lending is higher than the threshold return on lending that keeps the safe 
borrowers in the market.  
One of the strategies used as a screening mechanism by the MFI is joint liability lending. This 
approach can address the screening problem, but in some cases (i.e when the borrowers do not 
find enough homogeneous partners to fill the required group size and have information 
barriers) its benefit is very small as explained by Ghatak1999 and  Armendáriz De Aghion 
and Gollier (2000).  
Ghatak’s model of assortative matching   
The borrower in a group loan who is successful in addition to meeting his own loan 
repayment (r) is liable for the amount (c) of his partner’s loan if his partner fails. This joint 
liability enables the MFI to discover the information of the borrowers (if they have perfect 
information) as they will be positively assertively matched.  
Given the announced value of (r,c) by the MFI in the first stage, borrowers will choose 
partners of the same type in the second stage.  
The expected pay off of borrower type i when her partner is type j under joint liability lending 
is  
EU P i P j (r ,C )=Pi P j(Y i−r)+Pi(1−P j)(Y i−r−C )  
 Which can be written as EU P i P j (r ,C )=Pi(Y i−r)−Pi(1−P j)(C)  
To determine whether the risky and safe borrowers have matched or not requires comparing 
the net expected gain of risky type from having safe type and the net expected loss of safe 
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type from having risky type. If the net expected gain of the former is large enough to cover 
the net expected loss of the latter, then negative assortative matching has resulted. However, 
the comparison below shows that this is not possible 
The net expected gain of risky borrower from having safe partner is  
EU r s(r ,C)−EU r r(r ,C)=Pr (Ps−Pr)(C)  
And the net expected loss of the safe borrower from having risky partner is  
EU s s(r ,C)−EU s r(r ,C)=Ps(Ps−Pr)(C)  
Since P r<P s  from the two equations it is clear that the net expected gain of the risky type is 
always smaller than the net expected loss of the safe type 
EU r s(r ,C)−EU r r(r ,C)=Pr (Ps−Pr)(C)  < EU s s(r ,C)−EU s r(r ,C)=Ps(Ps−Pr)(C)  
Therefore the net gain that the risky borrower obtains from being matched with a safe type is 
not enough to cover the net cost that the safe borrower incurs from being matched with a risky 
type. Hence, in equilibrium group formation, negative assortative matching of groups is not 
possible.   Although both risky and safe borrowers want safe borrowers, the latter value safe 
borrowers more than the risky borrower does.  Thus, there is no mutually beneficial way for 
risky and safe types to group together; that is, a risky borrower cannot cross-subsidize a safe 
borrower in order to be accepted as a partner, leading to a group with similar risk behaviour 
(i.e positive assortative matching) 
Therefore, with the positive assortative matching the MFI is able to screen borrowers and 
offer separate contracts for risky and safe borrowers, and thus, is able to improve their loan 
repayment rates under group lending.  
Ghatak's homogeneous assortative matching model provides a good rationale for the Burundi 
MFIs that mentioned group lending as a good screening mechanism.  However, when the 
risky type is more numerous than the safe type, which is a possible scenario in post-war 
areas
7
, assortative matching is sometimes not possible. MFIs that mentioned little benefit 
from group screening could be seeing the failure of positive assortative matching in areas 
                                                 
7
 Remember the  risky vs safe borrowers classification in this paper is based on the borrows conception of the 
loan. Those who misconceive the loan with grant are risky and those who have right perception about the loan 
are safe. See the assumption above. And in post conflict environment the risky type can be very high as 
compared to the normal environment as a result of the high relief intervention in such places. 
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were the proportion of risky borrowers is so high that safe borrower groups could not find 
enough partners of same type to fill the required group size. Ghatak’s (1999) extension of the 
model offers a reason for this outcome. 
As per Ghatak 1999, when the supply of partners of each type is unbalanced with respect to 
the required group size, the positive assortative matching won’t be possible. Since safe 
borrows will always attract the risky borrowers; when there is not enough safe type for the 
safe borrowers to form the required group size, they can always attract the risky borrowers 
away from its partners to fill the group size. In the formation of such heterogeneous group 
MFIs can get little advantage out of group lending to lower its high risk and raise the low 
repayment rate in the post conflict environment.   
In addition, the reason borrowers are not able to find enough partners might be due to 
imperfect information about each other, a problem resulting from population displacement. 
When borrowers have imperfect information, homogenous assortative matching is unlikely. 
Armendáriz De Aghion and Gollier (2000) show that with heterogeneous, anonymous, and 
relatively mobile borrowers, random (rather than assortative) matching is incentive 
compatible for all types of borrowers. As per their finding under imperfect information among 
borrowers, homogenous assortative matching no longer leads to an equilibrium situation.  
This means that the benefit of screening that the MFIs  get from group lending can decrease, 
leading to little gain from  group lending in post-conflict area as borrowers have imperfect 
information about each other.  
Therefore, not much improvement in the loan repayment rate can be achieved even under 
joint liability lending in a post-war scenario when there is a high risky client proportion and 
borrowers having imperfect information about each other. 
4.2 Moral Hazard Model  
Similar to the adverse selection discussion, this section, start from the full information case 
and continue to explain how specific post-conflict factors make it difficult for MFIs to solve 
moral hazard problems when there are information barriers in monitoring how the borrower 
uses the money. The primary instruments typically used by MFIs to mitigate the effect of 
moral hazards   associated with these barriers concerning the action of the clients are group 
collateral(c), group social pressure/sanction (w),   group implicit collateral (F) and dynamic 
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incentive (δY).  However in the post-conflict environment due to high client mobility, the 
creation of various population features and the loss of assets by a significant number of 
people, the weight borrowers give to the next loan period, the social stigma, and the implicit 
collateral possibility among group borrowers is lower.  
To explore this relationship, I developed a moral hazard model, one that extends Ghatak’s 
(1999) model showing how group lending reduces moral hazard. The model I developed here 
adds social pressure (W),   group implicit collateral (F), and dynamic incentive (δh) to the 
group collateral found in Ghatak’s model.   These instruments are included as they are used 
by MFIs to put pressure on and to add incentives to make clients put forth a high effort in the 
absence of access to information for monitoring their action.  
Assumption 
This model includes all of the assumptions of adverse selection except in this case the 
representative MFI can completely distinguish between borrower type but does not have full 
information on how the borrowers use the money.  
Under such a moral hazard scenario, the borrower does not fully internalize the cost of the 
project failure; therefore, he will choose less action which may lead it to a lower probability 
of success, meaning that the MFI will have a lower probability of getting its money back.  
 Borrowers get higher output Yh with probability p and with probability (1-p) 0. But in 
this case the probability of borrower success depends on borrower action. As in 
Ghatak(1999), it is assumed that borrowers take actions which can be considered as a 
level of effort Pε [0,1]   costing him  a disutility cost of 1/2βp2..  As before if borrowers 
are successful, they can repay the loan; if not, they will default. Therefore, higher 
probability of borrower success means higher probability of loan repayment for the 
MFI. 
 For the sake of simplicity, it is assumed that u=0 borrowers have 0 reservation utility.  
 Borrowers in a group can observe one another perfectly and without cost as well as 
enforce agreement regardless of their levels.  
Full information  
Under full information, the MFI can fully observe the borrower’s choice of action without any 
cost.  In this case the MFI can always make the borrower choose the maximum P* that 
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maximizes the social surplus by announcing the rate of return from lending the equivalent to 
it.  
The p that maximizes the social surplus is  
P*=  arg max{pYh- 1/2βp
2 
 +(1-p) 0} =  Yh/ β, Assume Yh   <   β........................... (Equation 1) 
Therefore based on this, the MFI that maximizes social surplus under its condition of making 
zero profit will charge r=r*= ρ/ P*. 
Based on the announced interest rate, the borrower participates by choosing an action such 
that its expected marginal return equals its marginal cost (which is P *). Therefore, under full 
information the MFI can achieve the highest possible repayment rate because it can make the 
borrower implement the action P*= Yh/ β 
When there are information barriers such that the MFI cannot  see how the borrower uses the 
money, a  borrower that aims to maximizes his  own pay-off will deviate from P*. This is 
found in particular in the absence of collateral or other means of putting  pressure on  a 
borrower to implement the  best action which can give a higher probability of success and 
thereby a higher repayment rate for the MFI.   
In the post-conflict environment, solving the moral hazard problem is more difficult because 
of the post-conflict factor that weakens the instruments MFIs typically use to curb this 
problem.  
When there are information barriers concerning how the borrower uses the money, the 
borrower that maximizes his pay-off will deviate from P* by choosing P given the interest 
rate based on the following optimization:  
P =  arg max{p(Yh-r)- 1/2βp
2 
 +(1-p) 0} =  (Yh -r)/ β,  .......................... (Equation 2) 
This is prevails especially in the absence of collateral or other means of making pressure on 
borrower to implement the first best action which can give higher probability of success and 
thereby higher repayment rate for the MFI.  
 P chosen by the borrower under the moral hazard is lower than P under perfect information. 
In this case, if the MFI does not  use any instrument for monitoring or other mechanisms that 
put pressure on the borrower to put forth more effort, the borrower will select                    
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P=(Yh -r)/ β  <  Yh/ β . Therefore, the probability of borrower success and the probability of 
loan repayment for the MFI decrease under this moral hazard scenario. 
Putting P= (Yh -r)/ β from the borrower maximization condition to the MFI zero profit 
conduction to find the equilibrium P gives the following result: 
Pr= ρ    ..................................................................... (Equation 3) 
⇒ βp
2−Y h p+ρ=0      ........................................ (Equation 4) 
This quadratic equation can give two values for P consistence with the equilibrium. This 
research assumes that the equilibrium with the highest value of P will be chosen.  
    
   √  
     
  
 
Taking the highest of the two P  
    
   √  





The typical microfinance instruments mentioned above can reduce the moral hazard problem. 
However, in the post-conflict scenario, these instruments are not powerful enough to solve the 
moral hazard problem. The section below illustrates this by extending the model to include 
the typical MFI instruments used for the solution of moral hazard.  
Group collateral (c)--Making borrowers jointly liable for the default of their co-members. 
When borrowers take out a loan jointly, they can co-operate or not co-operate. As in Ghatak 
(1999), the outcome of the joint liability instrument on the reduction of the moral hazard (and 
thereby increasing loan repayment) depends on how the borrowers in a group take action. In 
the post conflict economy gap created in the population because of the diverse population 
type in a community, and mobility means it is unlikely for groups to take action 
cooperatively.  This case will be considered in later calculations.     
 
                                                 
8
 Let us assume that Yh
2 
-4βρ> 0 , so that equilibrium P is possible.  
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Group implicit collateral (F)
9
--Encouraging borrowers to hold implicit collateral jointly. If a 
group member fails to repay his loan, the other members may take away their implicit 
collateral.  Therefore, holding F will apply peer pressure and by so doing control the moral 
hazard problem. The application of this peer pressure to reduce the moral hazard is difficult in 
the post-conflict economy due to the loss of assets by most of the population,   making the 
value of F very low. Therefore, in the post-conflict environment the potential of solving the 
moral hazard through implicit collateral is small.  
Social sanction or the social penalty (W)--Social sanction is another instrument MFIs use to 
put pressure on borrowers to encourage them to improve their efforts.   However in post-
conflict environments the population displacement and the creation of various population 
features reduce social stigma. With the lower social stigma, the ability of this instrument to 
curb the moral hazard problem is lower, leading to a lower p and, therefore, a lower 




(the  incentive of the future benefit of getting additional  loans 
from the MFI):- This can be used as a carrot rather  than the  stick of social sanction. By 
allowing the possibility of future loans only for groups who have paid back their loans, the 
MFIs create an incentive for borrowers to put more effort. But with the increased possibility 
of migration and the potential mobile population, the borrower discount factor for the future is 
low as is the value that the mobile population gives to a future loan. Thus, the moral hazard 
problem will less likely get solution through the dynamic incentive mechanism.   
In joint liability, here I assume that the group size is only 2, borrower i and j, and for 
simplicity only two periods are assumed.  
With the addition of the above four instrument, borrower i will now select p by maximizing 
his pay-off as follows:  
Max
pi((Y h−r)+δY h)+ pi(1−p j)(F−C)−(1−pi) p j(w+F )+(1−pi)(1−p j)0 – 1/2β pi
2..
(6) 10 . 
w.r.t pi   
                                                 
9
 Group implicit collateral (F): is punishment available within a group and the penalty is between borrowers not 
the punishment put by MFI on the borrower. 
10






- r+δYh -c+ F) - (1- 









next period (i.e. discounted future benefit of participating in the loan program) and pays his 
loan(r), and if his partner is unsuccessful, then he will pay this loan as well (c) but take away 
the collateral that he has pledged implicitly to his partner(F) and incur the disutility cost of 
implementing p effort (1/2βpi
2
). On the other hand, if he is unsuccessful and his partner is 
successful, he will face social sanction (W) and pay the implicit transfer of F to his partner 
(i.e W+F in total), but if his partner is also unsuccessful, both get 0.
11
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Assume the borrowers choose p non-co-operatively; that is the borrower when taking action 
doesn’t take into account that his actions affect his partner’s choice.  The borrower chooses 
his action by taking his partner’s action as a given.  
The best response of borrower i from the F.O.C is  
  
  
                      
 
                 










To find the equilibrium p which satisfies the MFI zero-profit condition, substitute the above 
equilibrium condition of the borrower into the MFI zero-profit condition. 
            ……………………………………………………....(8) 
This gives the following quadratic equation in p:  
p2[β−w]−[(1+δ)Y h+F ] p+ρ=0......................................................... (9)  
There are two values of p consistence with the equilibrium. This research assumes the 
equilibrium with the higher value of P is chosen, denoted as P
∘∘
 
    
            √[                    ]
      
                
                                                 
11
 I built this with the assumption that in addition to repaying their own share of the loan, each group member 
must accept to repay the obligations of their defaulting borrower; other- wise the entire group is denied access to 
future refinancing.  If a borrower defaulted but the other borrower not then the borrower who pays the loan will 
not include him in the next period. Therefore when the other partner covers the loan, the defaulting borrower in 
addition to facing a social sanction W and group penalty F he will not receive next period loan so that he won’t 
have δYh
 
next period in state (1- pi)pj. 
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Consistence with the assumed case that borrowers are acting non-co-operatively, the 
equilibrium     in Equation (10) shows that joint liability (c) does not matter. But all other 
instruments, borrowers’ implicit collateral (F), social sanction (W), and the possibility of 
getting the loan and investing in a project in the next period (δYh), contribute to curbing the 
moral hazard problem by enabling borrower choice P to increase under the moral hazard 
condition.   
This can be seen by comparing the two equilibriums P ∘∘   found the under moral hazard 
when the MFI did not use any instruments (Equation  5) (i.e P∘∘=
Y h+√Y h2−4 β ρ
2 β
) and in 
P ∘∘ in (Equation 10) found when the MFI uses its common measure for combatting moral 
hazard.  The numerator of Equation (10) is higher than the corresponding expression of 
Equation (5), while the denominator of Equation (10) is lower than that of Equation (5).   
However, in the post-conflict environment the reduction in these values for the reasons 
mentioned above means that P will still decrease, leaving the moral hazard problem unsolved 
for the MFIs that operate in such an environment, resulting in lower probability of success 
and loan repayment. 
This result can be shown from the derivation of p ∘∘ with respect to each of the three 
instruments. Assume  β>w  
    
  
 
√[                    ]             
      √[                    ]
   
This means that in the post-war environment, the loss of assets of most borrowers lowers F 
(the implicit collateral that co-members hold to apply pressure on partners to put forth the 
required effort).  Therefore, the lower F is positively associated with a lower probability of 
success, eventually leading to a lower probability of loan repayment. 
    
  
 
√[                    ]               
      √[                    ]
   
This differentiation result suggests that the relation between the future discount factor of the 
people δ and P is positive. In a post-war scenario the potential mobility can decrease the 
discount factor δ, making the people highly impatient and decreasing the weight that they give 
the next period. This implies that the value that the people give for a future loan (δ Y h ) is 
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lower and the probability of their success will decrease giving the MFI a lower repayment 
rate.    
    
  
 
                    √[                    ]
 √[                    ]      
   
 
This differentiation result indicates that the equilibrium probability of success and social 
sanctions are positively related:  the lower the social stigma/sanction, the lower the  peer 
pressure which decreases the probability of success of the borrower, thereby reducing the 
probability of loan repayment.  
In conclusion when MFIs do not  have enough information on how the borrowers use the 
money, the post-war factors decrease their loan repayment rate,  rendering powerless the 
instruments used by these institutions for encouraging  loan repayment and causing borrowers 
to shirk their effort and divert the loan into less successful activities. 
4.3 Enforcement   
If it is assumed that the judicial system is perfect and benevolent, and consequently can 
enforce any contract without any cost, then there is no fear of the contract being breached 
between MFI and the borrower.  However, a less than perfect contractual situation requires 
some kind of incentives and penalties that can enforce the opportunistic borrower who 
maximizes his pay-off to repay the loan even in the event his project succeeds.  
The issue here is that the borrower can still default even if his project succeeds; the problem 
involves enforcing repayment after some amount of return is realized by the borrower.  To 
show the implication of the post-conflict factor of loosening the enforcement constraint of 
borrowers and thereby increasing loan defaults, this research assumes there is no moral hazard 
(information barriers on monitoring the borrower) or adverse selection (information 
asymmetry on identifying the type of borrower).  
In imperfect contract enforcement, there is always a gain for a borrower by breaching the 
agreement unless there is sufficient penalty or incentive to ensure the repayment of the loan.  
If  there is no instrument that can effectively serve as an incentive or a penalty,  borrowers can 
always gain by defaulting; that is the gain from default is (Y) and the gain from payment is 
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(Y-r), meaning that Y > (Y-r). To mitigate the problem of borrowers breaching contracts, 
MFIs use instruments such as extending loans next period to only those borrowers who did 
not default their loan and using group loans along with the implicit collateral that the group 
members hold jointly and social sanctions.  
These instruments, which were explained in the ex-ant moral hazard case, can be affected by 
the post-conflict factors. The high population mobility can reduce the incentive of  next 
period loans; the different population features in a community along with the displacement of 
the people can reduce the social sanction; the loss of assets due to a  war can reduce the 
implicit collateral that the borrowers hold.  Consequently, the enforcement constraint will 
loosen, leading to the likelihood of default in such environments.   
The equation below elaborates the enforcement constraint on a borrower. This equation will 
extend the case above.  This model will include all of the assumptions used in the moral 
hazard and adverse selection parts except that here it is also assumed that there is no 
information asymmetry problem concerning the intent characteristic of borrower or the way 
the loan is put.  Again for the sake of simplicity of calculation, the outside opportunity of 
borrower/reservation utility is considered to be 0.  And the participation constraint of the 
borrower (the individual rationality constraint) holds.  
In group lending, the gain from the payment and default comparison for a borrower i depends 
on the decision of borrower j.  
Case 1-- If borrower j pays  
Borrower i will pay if his gain from payment outweighs his gain from default given that 
borrower j paid the loan. This comparison is  
Y i−r+δY i≥Y i–W – F  
For this to be satisfied  
    
    
     
 
  
Case 2-- If borrower j does not pay  
Borrower i will pay if his gain from payment outweighs his gain from default given that 
borrower j did not pay loan. The comparison in this case is  
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Y i−2r+δY i+F ≥ Y i  
For this to be satisfied  
    
    
    
 
 
These case indicate that the MFI will get paid if at least one of the borrowers gets   
    
 
   , 
where s = i or j; that is if either i or j obtains  a return at least as high as 
    
 
, then the MFI 
will always be paid. 







, then the MFI will get paid if and only if borrower j also gets a 
return at least as high as
r−W −F
δ , (i.e. 
     
 
   ); otherwise both borrowers default.  
Reduction in the weight that borrowers give for next period income due to mobility (i.e 
lower δ) means  
In Case 1  
    
  
    
     
  
   ;  in Case 2 
    
  
    
    
  
   
This indicates that threshold return    increases with a decrease in the weight that the people 
give to the next period loan, meaning the likelihood of loan repayment decreases.   
 
Effect of change in social sanction   
In Case 1 





   ; in Case 2 
    
  
   
The reduction in the social stigma as a result of population displacement and the creation of 
various of population features can also increase the threshold return in these cases, leading to 
a lower likelihood of loan repayment.  
                                                 
12
 Since r is positive this always hold 
     
 
 
    
 
 which means the need threshold return for no default 
constraint to satisfy, is greater in the latter case (i.e in the case when his partner default)  than the needed 
threshold return in the first case.(i.e when the other pays)  
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However, if at least one of the borrowers (e.g. borrower i) earns a high return such that 
     
   
    
 
 , then the reduction in the social sanction (W) will not  affect the threshold 
Y, so the MFI's chance of repayment rate is not affected by the social sanction.  A reduction 





δ where s= i, j 
The reduction in F can decrease the thresholds in both cases  
In Case 1 





    and in Case 2 





    
The likelihood of MFIs loan repayment decreases when the implicit collateral possibility that 
the group holds for enforcement decreases. In both cases the derivative of threshold return 
increases when F increases. For all returns that both borrowers achieved at least 
r−W −F
δ  
(i.e.      
     
 
), the likelihood of loan repayment decreases if  
F reduces. 
Indirect effect of lower W and F in the post-conflict scenario  
(W and F together will be referred to as the   group social penalty mechanism).  
The indirect effect can be explained similar to Besely (1995): when there is a lower group 
social penalty mechanism, there will be cases where MFIs could get a higher loan repayment 
by using individual loans rather than group loans. In addition, by continuing to give group 
loans to groups with low group social penalty mechanisms (i.e., lower W+F), MFIs lose loan 
repayments that they could have obtained if they were using individual loan mechanisms.  
For simplicity of showing the effect of low W and F, it is assumed W+F= 0 
Using a similar procedure as before, threshold Y is calculated where loan repayment is 







Under group lending  
Case 1-- If borrower j pays  
Borrower i will pay if his gain from payment outweighs his gain from default given that 
borrower j paid the loan. This comparison is  
Y i−r+δY i≥Y i  
For this to be satisfied  
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Case 2--If borrower j doesn't pay  
Borrower i will pay if his gain from payment outweighs his gain from default given that 
borrower j does not pay the loan. The comparison in this case is  
Y i−2r+δY i≥Y i  
For this to be satisfied  
     
  
 
    
From these cases, MFI will get paid if at least one of the borrowers gets     
  
 
     where 
s= i or j. That is if either i or j get a return at least as high as
  
 
, then the MFI will always be 
paid. 















   ; otherwise both borrowers default. 
 
 
                                                 
13 This threshold return that satisfies the enforcement constraint under group lending case 1 is similar to 
the threshold return required under individual lending. 






 always hold. This means the threshold return required to satisfy the no default 
constraint is greater in the latter case.  (i.e. in the case when his partner default than pays) 
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For the individual loan case  
Under the individual loan condition, the threshold of return necessary for the enforcement 
constraint to satisfy (that is for the borrower to be willing /incentivized/ to pay), the gain from 
his payment has to be greater than the loss from his payment no matter what j decides. The 
repayment decision of i does not depend on the repayment decision of j. This means that   
 
Y i−r+δY i≥Y i  
For this to be satisfied  
    
 
 
    
This is also true for j  
    
 
 
    













Table  A, B , C and D:  Pay-off matrix for group lending with and 
without group social penalty and the pay-off representation of 
individual lending 
 
For group lending  




Pay (P) Not pay (N)  
 
Pay (P) Not Pay  
Pay 
(P) 









(Yj, Yi-2r+δYi) (Yj, Yi)  Not 
Pay 
(N) 
(Yj-W-F, Yi-2r+δYi+F) (Yj, Yi) 
 
For the individual loan case  
Pay-off for the repayment decision of the individual under individual lending 
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Table C  Table D  The pay-off representation of 
a row player 
 
Pay (P) Not pay (N)  
 
Pay (P) Not pay (N) 








                                                 
15 I put green color & bold in the cases where social penalty makes a difference in the payoff from group 
loan without social penalty mechanisms 
16 I used red color and italic font in the cases where individual loan makes a difference in the payoff from 









The game of borrowers under the individual lending strategy is a symmetric game (where the 
pay-offs do not depend on which player chooses each action). Therefore, it is represented with 
only one pay-off (row player pay-off) in table D for clarity. S represents i or j.  
Before making the comparison, assume r > F; then the aforementioned thresholds mean  
                          












     
 
   The minimum threshold return required for a borrower in a group loan to be 
incentivized to pay given that his partner is paying the loan.  
 
 
-- The minimum threshold returns that a borrower under an individual loan will be 
incentivized to pay. (And it is independent of the other borrower decisions.) 
 -- It can also be a minimum threshold return for a borrower under a group loan to be 
incentivized to pay given that the other borrower has paid the loan. (When groups do not have 
sufficient group social penalty mechanisms (in this research when W+F=0))   
    
 
--The minimum threshold return required for a borrower under a group loan to be 
incentivized to pay given that the other partner is defaulting on his loan.  
  
 
-- The minimum threshold return required for a borrower under a group loan to be 
incentivized to pay given that the other partner is defaulting. For the case where W+F =0  
The cases below illustrate where the MFI loses repayment rates as a result of group loans in a 
post-conflict area where the group social penalty mechanism is low stating from the case were 
group lending outweighing individual lending 
Case A  
Group lending outweighs individual lending in terms of the likelihood of getting the money 
back in cases where  
One borrower, for example borrower I,  gets a return at least as high as 
  
 
, and the other 












In this case, in the Nash equilibrium the repayment decision of the borrowers under group 
lending is (Nj, Pi), but the MFI will be covered for both j's and i's loan because P (payment) of 
at least one borrower under a group loan means the payment of both his and his partner’s 
loan. 
In the Nash equilibrium the repayment decisions of borrowers under individual lending is (Nj, 
Pi), but the MFI will be covered for i's loan only. 
This comparison indicates that group lending enables the MFI to receive a higher loan 
repayment even if the group social penalty mechanisms are low as in this case. 
Case B 
Case B illustrates the possibility in which individual lending would have been better for the 
MFIs to follow in the post-conflict environment where W and F are very low 
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In this case, the Nash equilibrium decision of borrowers under group lending is (Nj, Ni), and 
the MFI will not be paid.   
The Nash equilibrium decision of borrowers under individual lending is (Nj, Pi), and the MFI 
will be paid at least by one of the borrowers.  
Therefore, the MFI will have a higher repayment rate under individual lending. Hence, by 
continuing to rely on the typical group lending mechanism, the MFI,  rather than getting 
higher loan repayments,  loses its chance of getting its money back.  
Therefore, a lower group social penalty mechanism can also indirectly affect the MFI when it 
is simply following the Grameen style of group lending methodology while group losing their 
social enforcement mechanism. Hence, the chance of loan repayment for the MFI will be 
smaller. 
                                                 
17  The mechanism that the MFI created for getting more repayment (i.e group loan ) will create more 
likelihood of default 
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Then the group loan would have done better than individual loans due to the social penalty 
mechanism because in this case the Nash equilibrium for borrowers under a group loan is (Pj, 
Pi) and the Nash equilibrium for borrowers under individual loan is (Nj, Pi) 
In the group loan situation the MFI will be paid back for both i’s and j’s loan whereas in 
individual loan the MFI will be paid by only one of the borrowers; therefore, due to the group 
social penalty mechanism, the MFI by using group loan will realize a higher loan repayment. 
Extension of the enforcement model  
It could also be possible to model the enforcement problem from the perspective of 
misconception in the post-conflict environment.   For this problem, it is assumed that 
borrowers have already gotten output realization Y, and their misconception affects their 
willingness to repay the loan.  Here the misconception of a loan as a grant is considered as an 
enforcement problem rather than as an adverse selection problem as  discussed in the 
information asymmetry section.   Thus, under imperfect contractual enforcement when 
borrowers totally misconceive the loan, determining a critical threshold for borrowers to be 
willing to pay back the money is unlikely, meaning that the loan repayment rate of the MFIs 
will decline.  Here misconception affects their willingness to repay, not the  kind of 
investment possibility /projects/ borrowers choose (safe vs risky) as  already discussed  in the 
adverse selection case.  
This case is based on all the assumptions and the variable interpretations previously used. It 
begins with the scenario where borrowers misunderstand the loan and then moves to the case 
where borrowers have the right perception of it.   
In the current model, when borrowers misperceive the loan, it means they expect to obtain δY 
whether they default or not while the MFI has put a penalty of not giving loans for defaulting 
borrowers for the next period.  Borrowers mistakenly believe the MFI is a relief/ aid 
organization and assume that there will be not a penalty for not paying back the loan.   And if 
all borrowers misunderstand the loan, then there is no group penalty--either social sanctions 
(W) or penalizing through the implicit collateral that they jointly hold (F). Consequently, 
W+F is 0.  
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Therefore, in such a scenario because of the borrowers’ misconception of the loan, the chance 
of the MFI of getting its money back is extremely low or very unlikely.   
For any borrower i or j  
The gain from payment for a borrower is Y + δY-2r 
The gain from default of a borrower is Y + δY 18 
When borrowers misunderstand the loan, the gain from default always outweighs the gain 
from repaying the loan. Therefore, borrowers even under group loan won’t pay back the loan.  
But when borrowers have the correct understanding of the micro-loan product, the MFI can 
create incentives encouraging the borrowers to repay the money as shown previously.  
Borrowers with the correct right understanding about the loan means they expect to have δY 
(discounted return from the loan investment) next period only if they pay back the loan, and if 
not, they expect 0. The social penalties W and F can also be positive
19
 because the society has 
the correct understanding and, therefore, they abide by the norms of the loan.  
Therefore as illustrated in the previous section, creating critical level of return at which the 
borrower is willing or can be forced to repay the loan is possible.   
In the group loan case  
MFI will get paid if at least one of the borrowers gets 
    
 
   , s= i or j; that is if either i or j 
gets a return at least as high as 
    
 
, then the MFI will always be paid. 







, then the MFI will get paid if and only if borrower j gets a return at 
least as high as 
r−W −F
δ  (i.e. 
     
 
   ); otherwise both borrower default.   
                                                 
18 The gain from default changed from the previous section because as explained borrowers misconceive 
the loan means the penalty of losing next period loan won’t occur and they expect to certainly get it. Besides that 
the social/ group penalties will not be there.   
19  W+F > 0 such that 
     
 
    
 
 
  where s = i ,j 






 which means the need threshold return for no default 
constraint to satisfy, is greater in the latter case (i.e in the case when his partner default)  than the needed 
threshold return in the first case.(i.e when the other pays)  
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And in the individual loan case  
Borrower s, where s represents i or j, can be incentivized to pay back the money through the 
dynamic incentive of the next period loan. And there will be some critical level (   ) where a 
borrower will be willing to pay back the money.   
    
 
 
    , where s represents i or j.  
Thus, under imperfect contractual enforcement, when borrowers misperceive the loan, the 
chance of creating the threshold output level above which borrowers will be willing to pay the 




5 Conclusion  
The importance of microfinance institutions in the revitalization of a war-torn economy is 
crucial for offering financial assistance for small business to recover and enabling the 
mobilization of the society to economic activities.   However this unique potential can be lost 
unless MFIs focus on delivering sustainable financial support with strict loan collection 
procedures that ensure a high repayment rate.   
The microfinance innovative approach of downscaling finance to serve the  unbanked and 
productive poor by  controlling  information asymmetry (moral hazard and adverse selection), 
and enforcement problems with such mechanisms as peer pressure/group monitoring, peer 
selection and dynamic incentives may not be enough to address some of the factors  causing 
failure of loan repayment in the post-conflict environment. The effects of the misconceptions 
about loans, population mobility, population fragmentation, and the asset /wealth losses of 
households as a result of the long civil war are exacerbating the information asymmetry and 
enforcement problems and thereby causing loan defaults.  
The direct interviews conducted during February and March 2013 with MFIs in post-war 
Burundi on factors affecting their 2011 client loan default provided support for the crucial 
nature of these effects.  The misconception, population displacement along with the creation 
of population features, household poverty or asset losses, business risks and/or market losses 
were crucial factors reported affecting client loan repayment. 
The distorted credit know-how created as a result of relief intervention can limit the 
possibility of incentive compatible loan contracts for the MFIs and the clients. The increase in 
the number of clients who misunderstand a loan as a result of these long-term relief practices 
have implications on the MFI loan repayment rate from the adverse selection and enforcement 
perspective. If client misperception of loan as a grant leads to irresponsible fund management, 
then under the adverse selection scenario, a high risky equilibrium point is likely to result, 
giving MFIs a lower probability of getting their money back. Although group loans solve the 
screening problem, they are not the answer under all circumstances. When the supply of each 
type (risky vs. safe) is unbalanced within the required group size and when there is imperfect 
information among borrowers, groups less likely to be positively associatively matched, 
decreasing the effectiveness of the screening.  On the other hand, lack of proper credit 
understanding decreases the willingness to pay, reducing the repayment rate by making 
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enforcement difficult. The moral hazard and enforcement problems are also difficult to solve 
with population mobility, household wealth/asset losses, and population fragmentation. 
Loan reputation via offering a loan on a repeated basis is a viable incentive strategy for 
encouraging borrowers to repay the loan. This is particularly effective in addressing the 
enforcement problem and the information barriers affecting the monitoring of the actions of 
borrowers after receiving the loan. However, when clients are potentially mobile, it is difficult 
to create such an incentive.  With a high mobility potential, clients become impatience and 
give lower weight to the next period loan, weakening the monitoring and enforcement benefit 
of the dynamic incentive scheme.  This outcome is especially possible when clients move and 
don’t know exactly if or when they will return back to their dwelling place.     
The population displacement along with the creation of various population features is also 
another factor that worsens the moral hazard problem and loosens the enforcement 
constraints. This is because of the lower social stigma due to differences in the socio-
economic background of people, the way communities cooperate, lack of personal knowledge 
about each other and trust among potential clients that is resulted. Hence with this lower 
social stigma, it is difficult to utilize group peer monitoring and peer enforcement.  
 
Similarly, asset losses of most of the population in the community have analogous implication 
on lowering the possibility of controlling the moral hazard and enforcement problems. With 
smaller household assets, the clients have very little chance of utilizing implicit collateral for 
peer monitoring and enforcement.   
 
The difficulty of solving the moral hazard, adverse selection and enforcement problems as a 
result of these post-war factors requires MFIs first, to understand them and then, to apply this 
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Interview guide /questions used  
1 – General question about MFIs and their loan product characteristic  
- Number of years since its establishments/ commencing operation   
- Type of the MFI (Please specify whether the MFI is savings and credit cooperatives 
(SACCOs), public limited company, or  multi-sector projects or any other form)  
- List of financial products offered by the MFI (E.g Saving, credit, etc…) if other 
financial products please list it too. 
- Operational area (rural vs urban ) 
-  Number of product types, and  loan product characteristic21  
2 –portfolio quality and outreach for the year 2011  
- Loan repayment rate, Portfolio at risk (PAR ) 
- Outreach indicators :- amount of loan outstanding, loan granted, average loan size  
3- Factors for clients default in 2011  
- Reasons for the client default in 2011 and how those reasons contribute to loan 
default. 
- Post-conflict factors that are detrimental for loan repayment.  
4- On client profile and service  
- The different population sections22 reached by the MFI, 




                                                 
21
 loan maximum and minimum threshold, interest rate, collateral, loan period, and repayment 
frequency, loan processing time 
22
 Refuges, internally displaced, demobilized soldiers, returnees, and inhabitants.  
